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INTRODUCTION
In June of 2020, the Supreme Court issued the watershed
opinion Bostock v. Clayton County which holds that, under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, discrimination because of sexual
orientation and gender identity is necessarily and undisguisably
discrimination because of sex.1 This Note argues that, while Bostock
* J. Reuben Clark Law School, J.D. Candidate 2022. Fordham University, B.A. 2019.
Many thanks to Dean Michalyn Steele for her insights and feedback, and Clara Hubbard for
her support and knowledge.
1. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
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is historic and a critical step for LGBTQ+ rights, the majority was
incorrect in failing to incorporate the precedent of Price Waterhouse
that held discrimination because of sex includes sex stereotyping.2
This omission, along with the failure to consider sexualities besides
gay and lesbian, or gender identities besides male and female,
leaves the decision susceptible to being read narrowly by lower
courts. If read narrowly, some courts may find that bisexual and
nonbinary employees are not protected by Title VII’s prohibition on
sex discrimination. Furthermore, the Court leaves many questions
unanswered, including the impact the case will have on other
federal statutes that prohibit sex discrimination and how to properly
balance the First Amendment rights to freedom of religion with the
prohibition on sex discrimination.
After the Supreme Court legalized gay marriage in 2015
through the landmark case Obergefell v. Hodges, a paradox became
apparent: “a gay person could be legally married in any of the fifty
states on Saturday and fired from her job because of that marriage
on Monday.”3 While Bostock resolved this paradox by prohibiting
discrimination against gay, lesbian, and transgender (“trans”)
employees, the failure of the Court to properly incorporate a Price
Waterhouse analysis leaves the holding susceptible to narrow
interpretations that would harm LGBTQ+ employees.
The proper redress to entrench sex discrimination as including
discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender identity is
for Congress to pass the Equality Act. The Equality Act, as most
recently presented to the Senate in February of 2021,4 will amend
the Civil Rights Act to include protections for LGBTQ+ individuals
and will prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in more areas of
the law outside of employment. Passing the Equality Act will
eliminate the possibility of circuit splits that would limit
protections for bisexual and nonbinary individuals. It will also
dictate the balancing test between sex discrimination and Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) claims.

2. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244 (1994).
3. Ann C. McGinley, Nicole Buonocore Porter, Danielle Weatherby, Ryan H. Nelson,
Pamela Wilkins & Catherine Jean Archibald, Feminist Perspectives on Bostock v. Clayton
County, 53 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2020).
4. Equality Act, S. 393, 117th Cong. (2021).
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Outside of employment discrimination claims, the present
patchwork across states—of nondiscrimination laws in some states
and explicitly anti-trans and anti-gay legislation in others—leaves
“millions of people subject to uncertainty and potential
discrimination that impacts their safety, their families, and their
day-to-day lives.”5 The Equality Act will provide for a unified
system of protection for LGBTQ+ individuals that is not limited to
employment or geographic location.
I. THE COURT’S REASONING IN BOSTOCK
Bostock, decided in June of 2020, is a watershed Supreme Court
case that extends the prohibition of discrimination because of sex
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to include discrimination because
of sexual orientation and gender identity.6 The majority opinion,
authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, held that “[a]n employer who
fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that
person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in
members of a different sex.”7 When an individual is fired because
of their sexuality or gender identity, “[s]ex plays a necessary and
undisguisable role in the [firing] decision, exactly what Title VII
forbids.”8 The opinion, while relying on a plain language reading
of Title VII, examines the statutory history of Title VII and considers
the Court’s past willingness to broadly interpret “sex discrimination.”
A. The History of the Civil Rights Act
Understanding the history of the inclusion of discrimination
because of sex as a prohibited ground under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act is critical to understanding the bedrock foundation
motivating the Court’s holding.
The prohibition of discrimination based on sex was famously
introduced by an amendment offered by Representative Howard
Smith who opposed the Civil Rights Act.9 The language was added
to the text of the Act “only two days before the bill’s passage in the
5. The Equality Act, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.hrc.org/
resources/equality.
6. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 110 CONG. REC. H2577 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964).
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House, without prior hearing or debate . . . .”10 However, the “little
legislative history that exist[s]” indicates Congress intended for the
provision to protect only women.11
Representative Smith, who introduced the amendment to
include sex, “professed to be serious about the matter, claiming that
women have just as much right to be free from discrimination as
any other minority group.”12 The floor debates over the
amendment were not particularly robust or earnest. Most
representatives found it “difficult” to speak against the amendment
“without appearing to favor discrimination against women, a
position politically dangerous and hard to defend logically.”13 The
main thrust of the opposition to the amendment, led by
Representative Emanuel Celler, relied on the idea that
discrimination based on sex “involves problems sufficiently
different from discrimination based on the other factors listed to
make separate treatment preferable” and it would ultimately “not
be to the best advantage of women” at the time.14 Representatives
who spoke in favor of the amendment spoke “largely on emotional
reactions” with comments that “at times bordered on
irrelevancy.”15 Representative Martha Griffiths from Michigan
defended the amendment by stating “a vote against this
amendment today by a white man is a vote against his wife, or his
widow, or his daughter, or his sister.”16 Representative Katharine
St. George of New York argued “the addition of that terrifying little

10. Eric S. Dreiband & Brett Swearingen, The Evolution of Title VII—Sexual Orientation,
Gender Identity, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, JONES DAY 1, 2 (2015). Many historians, and
the general public, believe Representative Smith introduced the sex amendment as a poison
pill, believing that its inclusion would create enough opposition, particularly from labor
unions, for the Civil Rights Act to not pass. While Representative Smith claimed interest in
the amendment was genuine, he was already known as a staunch opposer of the Act. This
likely, at least in part, influenced the lack of robust debate on the amendment in the House
of Representatives. See NPR Staff, How a Poison Pill Worded as ‘Sex’ Gave Birth to Transgender
Rights, NPR: KIOS (May 15, 2016, 7:36 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/05/15/
478075804/how-a-poison-pill-worded-as-sex-gave-birth-to-transgender-rights.
11. Dreiband & Swearingen, supra note 10, at 3.
12. Robert Stevens Miller Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 880–81 (1966).
13. Id. at 881.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 881 n.27.
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word ‘s-e-x’ will not hurt this legislation in any way. In fact, it will
improve it. It will make it comprehensive.”17
Amidst these arguments on the inclusion of the amendment in
the House, there was virtually no discussion on the congressional
intent “as to interpretation of the amendment.”18 After the House
voted to include the amendment, “the word ‘sex’ was inserted in
each place where the words ‘race, color, religion, or national origin’
appeared.”19 Two days later, the Civil Rights Act passed from the
House to the Senate. While the Civil Rights Act was heavily
debated in the Senate, sex discrimination was “never seriously
considered.”20 There was no challenge to the inclusion of sex
discrimination, meaning there is no productive interpretive
guidance to be drawn from the Senate debates.21
When reflecting on the inclusion of sex discrimination shortly
after the Act passed, it was “viewed more as an accidental result of
political maneuvering than as a clear expression of congressional
intent to bring equal job opportunities to women.”22 Much of the
public sentiment toward the inclusion of sex discrimination was
indifferent. One newspaper wrote, “[w]hy should a mischievous
joke perpetrated on the floor of the House of Representatives be
treated by a responsible administrative body with this kind of
seriousness?”23 People considered the inclusion of sex in the Civil
17. Id.
18. Id. at 882.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 883. One of the primary thrusts of Justice Alito’s dissent in Bostock is that “the
concept of discrimination because of ‘sex’ is different from discrimination because of ‘sexual
orientation’ or ‘gender identity.’” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1755 (2020) (Alito,
J., dissenting). He posits that “if every single living American had been surveyed in 1964, it
would have been hard to find any who thought that discrimination because of sex meant
discrimination because of sexual orientation.” Id. However, the history of the inclusion of sex
discrimination demonstrates that the majority of Americans in 1964 likely did not believe
Title VII was intended to protect men or have the broader, more nuanced definition it does
today. The interpretation of sex discrimination has been beyond the scope intended by the
legislature when enacting the Civil Rights Act for a long time now. While Justice Alito posits
that, because Title VII has yet to be amended by any proposed legislation such as the Equality
Act, “discrimination because of ‘sex’ still means what it has always meant.” Bostock, 140 S.
Ct. at 1755. However, the lack of legislative history, along with Supreme Court Jurisprudence
and EEOC guidelines clearly indicate that there is no definition of “sex” that has remained
constant for the last 50 years.
22. Miller, supra note 12, at 884.
23. Id.
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Rights Act a “joke” or “fluke, born of segregationist antipathy to
African American civil rights” for decades following the passage of
the Act.24 However, as time went on, the involvement of the
National Woman’s Party and female members of Congress in
“pushing for an amendment banning sex discrimination” began
to be revealed.25Although current records note the work of
Representative Griffiths, National Woman’s Party Leaders, and
other activists in working for the inclusion of sex discrimination,
the congressional record still remains largely silent as to the intent
of the legislature.26
Shortly after the Civil Rights Act passed, a legal scholar argued
“[a] desirable interpretation of Title VII should be consistent
with . . . national policy” in light of the lack of legislative history to
provide illumination on interpretation.27 The scholar noted how
“[t]he differences in the scope of permissible legal discrimination
on the basis of sex and the other factors of Title VII reflect the
attitudes of the public. Women are biologically different from men
and have traditionally assumed a different role in our society.”28
The history of the Civil Rights Act and the inclusion of “sex” in
Title VII, as well as the public and scholarly opinions on its
inclusion would go on to influence the way sex discrimination
was interpreted.
B. Use of Sex Discrimination Jurisprudence
In the decades following the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the
Supreme Court and United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) worked to reconcile the lack of productive
legislative history and stigma surrounding sex discrimination as a
joke as they went on to clarify and interpret the meaning of sex
discrimination. The majority’s interpretation of sex discrimination
in Bostock descends from the logic used in previous Supreme Court
cases that first defined sex discrimination.
The Bostock Court primarily relies on the precedents of three
previous Supreme Court cases to support its definition of sex
24. Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV.
713, 716 (2015).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 717.
27. Miller, supra note 12, at 885.
28. Id. at 889.
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discrimination: Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,29 City of Los Angeles
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,30 and Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.31 Using these cases, the Court reconciles
its holding in Bostock with its jurisprudence to show why sex
discrimination includes discrimination because of sexual orientation
and gender identity. In previous cases interpreting sex
discrimination, the Court established “a classification-based, not a
class-based, approach, which focuses on fairness to individuals
rather than disparate treatment of classes.”32 These cases are used
by the Court to demonstrate that discrimination because of sex
includes the “entire spectrum” of sex-based discrimination,
encompassing all forms of sex discrimination regardless of whether
Congress contemplated that exact form when passing the Civil
Rights Act in 1964.33
Phillips was among the first cases to reach the Supreme Court
dealing with sex discrimination under Title VII. Phillips, a mother
with preschool-age children, was informed by a corporation where
she was attempting to apply for a job that the corporation was not
accepting job applications from women with preschool-age
children, even though it employed men with preschool-age
children.34 The Court interpreted Title VII to require that “persons
of like qualifications be given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex.”35 Because Title VII prohibits companies
from having one hiring policy for women and another for men, the
corporation was not permitted to have different hiring policies for
men and women where both had preschool-age children.36
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s concurrence asserts that Congress,
in passing the Civil Rights Act, was prohibiting businesses from
relying on “ancient canards about the proper role of women to be a
basis for discrimination.”37 This indication that sex stereotypes
acted as part of the rationale in the corporation’s improper hiring
29. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
30. City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
31. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
32. Katherine Carter, Questioning the Definition of “Sex” in Title VII: Bostock v. Clayton
County, GA, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 59, 67 (2020).
33. Id. at 73–74 (internal quotation omitted).
34. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543.
35. Id. at 544.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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policy would later be explored and deemed discriminatory in later
cases.38 Justice Marshall also considered the bona fide occupational
qualifications exception and warned the exception was not
“intended to swallow the rule.”39
The Court held in Manhart that employment decisions “cannot
be predicated on mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the
characteristics of males or females.”40 Title VII “makes it unlawful
‘to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”41 The
inquiry is about individuals, not groups.42 “It precludes treatment
of individuals as simply components” of a sex classification.43 Even
“true generalization[s] about the class” are insufficient reasons for
“disqualifying an individual.”44 When Congress enacted Title VII,
it “intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment”
resulting from sex stereotypes.45
Oncale further clarified what claims are actionable under Title
VII. A male oil rig worker filed a Title VII claim on the grounds that
sexual harassment directed at him by male co-workers constituted
discrimination because of sex.46 The Court, in an opinion authored
by Justice Antonin Scalia, held that Title VII claims are not barred
because the plaintiff and defendant are of the same sex.47 However,
the Court emphasized that Title VII is a narrow statute that only
prohibits discrimination because of sex; it is limited to situations
when “members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms
or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are
not exposed.”48

38. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
39. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
40. City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) (citing
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
41. Id. at 708 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)) (emphasis omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 707 n.13 (citing Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198).
46. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998).
47. Id. at 79.
48. Id. at 80 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
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A closer inspection of the key facts in Oncale indicates some of
the rationale possibly motivating the Court’s decision. The
employee was “forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating
actions” by other members of the crew, was “physically assaulted,”
and was threatened with rape.49 Justice Scalia, delivering the
unanimous opinion of the Court, observed while “male-on-male
sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal
evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII,” the
statute goes “beyond the principal evil” and it is “the provisions of
our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed.”50 Here, the Court explicitly recognizes
that the interpretation of sex discrimination has changed over time,
not in the text of the statute but in the evolving nature of values that
are protected within the scope of sex discrimination.51 The text of
Title VII has never read “because of being a woman,” even if that is
what was generally understood in 1964; the text of Title VII has
always stated “because of sex.” Discrimination on the basis of sex
includes discrimination by a man against another man.
In Bostock, the focus of Title VII on individuals was critical to
the decision, as it was in Manhart.52 The Court highlighted that Title
VII explicitly states employers may not discriminate against
individuals because of the individual’s sex.53 Relying on this
authority, it held “an employer who intentionally fires an
individual homosexual or transgender employee in part because of
that individual’s sex violates the law even if the employer is willing

49. Id. at 77.
50. Id. at 79.
51. In his dissent in Bostock, Justice Alito argues that “discrimination because of sex
means discrimination because the person in question is biologically male or female,” not
because of sexual orientation or because an individual “identifies as a member of a particular
gender.” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1757 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
However, as can be seen here, the Court has found on numerous occasions that Title VII is
not limited to such narrow grounds. Justice Alito appears to impermissibly read in the word
“biological” in front of “sex.” He relies on previous Court of Appeals jurisprudence to assert
that “until 2017, every single Court of Appeals” interpreted Title VII sex discrimination “to
mean discrimination on the basis of biological sex.” Id. This ignores the guidance and rulings
of the EEOC as he appears to argue that the word “biological” should be read into the Act
when there is no history to indicate that was the intent of the legislature. Id.
52. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740.
53. Id.
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to subject all male and all female homosexual or transgender
employees to the same rule.”54
The Court reconciles Bostock with Oncale and Phillips while also
using these cases to counter the nonexistent “canon of donut
holes.”55 Even though sexual orientation and gender identity are
not explicitly stated as protected grounds in Title VII, the failure of
Congress to speak directly to these grounds does not exclude them
from protection under Title VII sex discrimination.56 Justice
Gorsuch states there is no “such thing as a canon of donut holes, in
which Congress’s failure to speak directly to a specific case that falls
within a more general statutory rule creates a tacit exception.”57
Even though “sexual harassment” is not included in the list of
protected grounds in Title VII and is “conceptually distinct from
sex discrimination,” the Court found it to be included in sex
discrimination in Oncale.58 Likewise in Phillips, even though
“motherhood discrimination” is not explicitly listed in Title VII and
may not be the principle evil Title VII aimed to cure, it is
nonetheless included in the reach of sex discrimination.59 “Title VII
prohibits all forms of discrimination because of sex, however they
may manifest themselves or whatever other labels might attach
to them.”60
C. The Logic of Bostock
To illustrate how sex discrimination necessarily includes
discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender identity61
the Court presents a number of hypotheticals. If an employer has
two employees, “both of whom are attracted to men,” the two
individuals are “materially identical in all respects, except that one
is a man and the other is a woman.”62 “If the employer fires the male
54. Id. at 1744.
55. Id. at 1747.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80.
59. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747; Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
60. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747.
61. Discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender identity is necessarily
included in sex discrimination because it is “impossible to discriminate against a person for
being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on
sex.” Id. at 1741.
62. Id.
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employee for no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men,”
the employer has discriminated against the male employee for
“traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague.”63 This
necessarily means the employer has discriminated because of sex.64
To illustrate how sex discrimination necessarily includes
discrimination because of gender identity, Justice Gorsuch presents
another example.65 If an employer fires a trans individual who “was
identified as a male at birth but who now identifies as a female,”
and “the employer retains an otherwise identical employee who
was identified as female at birth,” the employer is intentionally
discriminating against the individual identified as male at birth for
“traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female
at birth.”66 Again, the sex of the employee is playing an
“unmistakable and impermissible role” in the firing decision.67
II. THE COURT REACHED THE RIGHT DECISION BUT FAILED TO
INCORPORATE THE PROPER ANALYSIS IN BOSTOCK
Despite establishing a legal basis for Bostock’s holding rooted in
previous Supreme Court cases, the Court failed to utilize the
precedent set by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.68 This omission, along
with the failure to discuss any sexual orientations besides gay and
lesbian, or gender identities besides cisgender and transgender,
and the failure to consider the implications of the decision on other
statutes and areas of law, leaves Bostock susceptible to being read
narrowly, causing additional harm to LGBTQ+ individuals.
A. The Absence of Price Waterhouse
One of the most important cases to deal with sex discrimination
is Price Waterhouse, where the Court held discrimination against
employees “because of sex” on a theory of “sex stereotyping” is
legally relevant under Title VII.69 The Court found “Congress’
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1741–42.
68. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
69. Id.
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intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making
employment decisions appears on the face of the statute,” which
means that “gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”70
Ultimately, the Court held “an employer who acts on the basis of a
belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be,
has acted on the basis of gender.”71
The facts in Price Waterhouse demonstrate the extent to which
the stereotyping faced by Ann Hopkins, a female employee at an
accounting firm whose candidacy for partnership was denied,
amounted to sex discrimination. Partners at her firm described her
as “macho,” advised her to “take a course at charm school,” and
directly told her she should “walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry” to increase her chances of partnership.72
The Court found that such treatment violated Title VII’s prohibition
of sex discrimination and that employers cannot evaluate
employees by “assuming or insisting” that they match the
“stereotype associated with their group.”73
Price Waterhouse clarified that the term “sex” in Title VII
encompasses both biological sex and gender. When gender plays a
role in an employer’s decision to take an “adverse employment
action,” they have committed sex discrimination.74
In the years following Price Waterhouse, the EEOC utilized the
holding of Price Waterhouse to expand sex discrimination to include
discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender identity
before Bostock ever reached the Supreme Court.
The EEOC was established by Title VII and is tasked with the
enforcement of Title VII and other federal workplace
anti-discrimination statutes, including the Equal Pay Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and more.75 From the beginning, the EEOC has had

70. Id. at 239–40.
71. Id. at 250.
72. Id. at 235.
73. Id. at 251.
74. See id. at 262 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
75. Tessa M. Register, The Case for Deferring to the EEOC’s Interpretations in Macy and
Foxx to Classify LGBT Discrimination as Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 102 IOWA L. REV.
1397, 1402 (2017) (citing Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2021)).
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jurisdiction to define the meaning of sex discrimination.76 Due to
the lack of legislative history and public sentiment that the
inclusion of sex discrimination was a “joke,” early EEOC
interpretations “explicitly prioritized race discrimination and
denigrated the sex amendment’s importance.”77 However, that is
not to say early interpretations did not deal with sex discrimination
to some degree.
The 1965 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex
published by the EEOC demonstrate the narrow interpretation that
was first used for sex discrimination. When considering what
constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification, the EEOC gave a
singular, narrow affirmative admission of an exception, stating
“[w]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or
genuineness, the Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide
occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or actress.”78
As time went on and sex discrimination claims started gaining
more legitimacy, the EEOC interpreted Title VII to prevent
employers from refusing to “hire an individual based on
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.”79 The bona fide
occupational qualification exception was clarified to be applicable
only to “job situations that require specific physical characteristics
necessarily possessed by only one sex.”80
As the interpretation of sex discrimination evolved with public
sentiment and Supreme Court jurisprudence, the question of
whether sexual orientation and gender identity are included in sex
discrimination reached the EEOC.
Beginning in 2012, the EEOC ruled “discrimination based on
gender identity, change of sex, and/or transgender status” is
discrimination because of sex under Title VII.81 Not only did the
EEOC rely on the sex stereotyping theory of Price Waterhouse to
reach the conclusion, but the Commission “utilized a new theory”
76. What Laws Does EEOC Enforce?, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/youth/what-laws-does-eeoc-enforce (last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
77. Mayeri, supra note 24, at 716.
78. Miller, supra note 12, at 892.
79. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall J., concurring)
(quoting U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex, 29 C.F.R § 1604.1(a)(1)(ii)).
80. Id. at 545–46 (citing U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.2).
81. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
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developed from the Supreme Court’s stereotyping analysis,
asserting that “Title VII prohibits employers from taking gender
into account in making employment decisions.”82
Under Macy v. Holder, employers who made adverse
employment decisions against trans individuals have
discriminated because of sex “because the individual has expressed
[their] gender in a non-stereotypical fashion, because the employer
is uncomfortable with the fact that the person has transitioned,” or
“because the employer simply does not like that the person is
identifying as a transgender person.”83 Accordingly, the EEOC
found “intentional discrimination against a transgender individual
because that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimination
based on . . . sex” and violates Title VII.84
Following Macy, the EEOC interpreted Title VII sex
discrimination to also include sexual orientation in the 2015
decision Baldwin v. Foxx.85 The EEOC ruled that the proper inquiry
is “whether the agency has ‘relied on sex-based considerations’ or
‘take[n] gender into account’ . . . rather than whether the statute
includes the phrase ‘sexual orientation.’”86 The EEOC reasoned that
sexual orientation is inherently linked to sex in three ways. First,
sexual orientation discrimination “necessarily entails treating an
employee less favorably because of the employee’s sex.”87 Second,
the EEOC found sexual orientation discrimination is a form of
“associational discrimination,” where employers are prohibited
from “taking adverse employment actions against an individual on
the basis of a relationship with a member of the same sex.”88 Third,
the EEOC used a Price Waterhouse rationale to explain
discrimination because of sexual orientation “inherently consists of
discrimination on the basis of gender stereotypes.”89

82. Dreiband & Swearingen, supra note 10, at 9 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)).
83. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *5.
84. Id. at *8 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Register, supra note 75, at 1399.
86. Id. at 1416 (quoting Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at
*4–5 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015)).
87. Id. (quoting Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641 at *5).
88. Id. at 1416–17 (citing Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641 at *7).
89. Id. at 1417 (citing Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641 at *7).
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Like the EEOC, lower courts have utilized Price Waterhouse to
incorporate discrimination because of sexual orientation and
gender identity into sex discrimination. The sex-stereotyping
theory of Price Waterhouse was extended by some circuit courts to
cover trans plaintiffs before the Supreme Court took up the issue.
The Sixth Circuit was the first court to do so in Smith v. City of Salem,
holding Price Waterhouse does not “provide any reason to exclude
Title VII coverage for non sex-stereotypical behavior simply
because the person is a transsexual.”90 The Second Circuit also
applied similar reasoning prior to Bostock in Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., finding that when an employer acts on the belief that
a male or female employee should not be attracted to another male
or female employee, respectively, the employer has discriminated
on the basis of gender.91
By omitting any application of Price Waterhouse in Bostock, the
Court failed to incorporate one of the critical factors that led the
EEOC and lower courts to reach the conclusion that sex
discrimination includes sexual orientation and gender identity:
Price Waterhouse is about perceived sex.92 Because sex and gender
are intimately linked, a person’s perceived sex dictates which
gender norms they are held to.93 Ann Hopkins both held herself out
as a woman, likely marking “female” on her job application or
indicating “female” on identifying work documents, and was
perceived to be female by her employer.94 Because she was
understood by her employer to be female, she was expected to
behave femininely too.95
Even though the majority opinion did not rely on Price
Waterhouse, Justice Alito addresses this argument in his dissent.96
Counsel for Bostock argued, resting on the authority of Price
Waterhouse, that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on
stereotypes “about the way men and women should behave.”97
When an employer discriminates because of sexual orientation or
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004).
See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2018).
Rachel Slepoi, Bostock’s Inclusive Queer Frame, 107 VA. L. REV. 67, 72 (2021).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1763–64 (2020) (Alito J., dissenting).
Id. at 1763.
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gender identity, they are relying on the stereotype that individuals
should only be attracted to persons of the opposite sex and the
belief that a person should identify with their sex at birth.98 Justice
Alito believes the argument fails because Title VII “prohibits
discrimination because of ‘sex’” which is a distinct concept from sex
stereotypes.99 While the two concepts are technically distinct from
one another, evidence of sex stereotypes is “relevant to prove
discrimination because of sex,” as Justice Alito concedes.100 While
Justice Alito believes this argument fails because the discrimination
applies “equally to men and women,” he fails to take into
consideration that the inquiry at issue in Title VII is about the
individual.101 It does not matter if the employer discriminates
against both lesbians and gay men because of sex stereotypes; what
matters is the discrimination faced by the individual because
of sex.102
The majority opinion in Bostock does not rely on Price
Waterhouse or a theory of sex stereotypes in its holding. However,
the holding of Price Waterhouse remains valuable to nonbinary and
bisexual individuals, more so than the reasoning used by the
Bostock majority. For instance, suppose an employer has a lesbian
employee and a female bisexual employee. The two employees are
materially identical except one exclusively dates women and the
other dates multiple genders. If the employer fires the bisexual
employee for dating multiple genders, the employer is relying on a
sex stereotype that women can only be attracted to a singular
gender.103 Likewise, imagine an employer has a trans female
employee, a trans male employee, and a nonbinary employee who
are materially identical except two identify as a male or female and
one does not identify as male or female. If the employer fires the
nonbinary employee for identifying with a gender outside of the
traditional gender binary, the employer is relying on a sex

98. Id.
99. Id. at 1764.
100. Id.
101. Id.; City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 702 (1978).
102. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1764.
103. The same reasoning applies to any scenario where there are two materially
identical employees of any gender, one dates exclusively one gender and the other dates
multiple genders, and the one who dates multiple genders is fired for dating multiple genders.
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stereotype that individuals must identify with either the male or
female gender.104
Because Title VII prohibits “certain motives, regardless of the
state of the actor’s knowledge,”105 incorporating a Price Waterhouse
analysis is critical to provide a cause of action to Title VII claims by
trans employees. Suppose an employer has two employees, both
trans women. One employee started hormone therapy when she
was sixteen, marks “female” on all her identifying documents, and
is perceived to be female by her employer. The other employee,
however, only recently came out as trans and has not undergone
any hormone therapy or other gender affirming care, but also
marks “female” on all her identifying documents. The employer
likely perceives a “clash” of maleness and femininity in the second
employee but may not perceive a “clash” in the first employee. The
employer can see the misalignment and “can use it to infer
transness, and that inference can motivate discrimination.”106
Under the theory of Price Waterhouse, which prohibits perceptive
sex discrimination, the second employee is protected, as is the first,
because discrimination against employees who are performing
gender “wrong” is likely impermissible.107 “Because perceived sex
determines how one interprets gender performance, perceived sex
is central” to trans identity and discrimination.108 However,
because Bostock does not incorporate sex stereotypes, the employer
could fire the second employee who does not present gender in the
way the employer expects, but be found to have not discriminated
because of sex because the employer did not fire the other
trans employee.
Bostock should have relied, at least in part, on Price Waterhouse
to determine that sex discrimination includes discrimination
because of sexual orientation and gender identity. Discrimination
against LGBTQ+ individuals “cannot be separated from gender
norms and stereotypes.”109 That approach would have “been
104. Again, this rationale is applicable to any scenario where there are two materially
identical employees, one who identifies within the traditional binary and one who is outside
of the gender binary, and the one who does not conform with the gender binary is fired for
not being male or female.
105. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 768 (2015).
106. Slepoi, supra note 92, at 74.
107. See id. at 75.
108. Id.
109. McGinley et al., supra note 3, at 12–13.
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rooted in solid precedent,” provided “clarity,” and created a “more
solid foundation for future cases” for all LGBTQ+ individuals.110
B. Consideration of Implications for Bisexual and Nonbinary Individuals
In the majority’s analysis, the Court only directly addresses the
“LGT” portion of LGBTQ+.111 The Court does not devote any
analysis to bisexual, pansexual, nonbinary, or queer individuals.
The only indication to the “+” was a broad “whatever other labels
might attach” statement that serves as a general acknowledgement
that the labels discussed in the opinion are not exhaustive.112 While
the analysis of the majority indicates that people with other
sexualities besides gay and lesbian or nonbinary gender identities
are protected from discrimination, the failure of the Court to
directly address other individuals creates additional litigation
barriers for employees seeking redress under Title VII. For instance,
the “omission of bisexuals forces advocates into a complicated and
messy posture, having to explain how it is that in an opinion
based on textualism, it does not matter that bisexuals are not
included in the opinion’s text.”113 As previously discussed, the
omission of bisexual identity from the opinion, along with the
failure to incorporate Price Waterhouse’s reasoning, may result in
discrimination against bisexual individuals not amounting to
sex discrimination.
The possibility that Bostock does not prohibit discrimination
based on “bisexuality . . . , pansexuality . . . , asexuality . . . , or
demisexuality or graysexuality” is rooted in the fact that none of
these sexualities “definitionally rely on the sex of the employee” in
the same way that gay and lesbian sexualities do.114 Because these
sexualities can “easily be defined without regard to the employee’s
sex,” the basic logic paradox presented in Bostock to illustrate the
Court’s reasoning does not apply neatly.115
The omission of Price Waterhouse, a case that has played a “huge
part in advancing” trans rights, as evidenced by the EEOC and
110. Id. at 13.
111. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1731 (2020).
112. Id. at 1747.
113. Nancy C. Marcus, Bostock v. Clayton County and the Problem of Bisexual Erasure,
115 NW. U. L. REV. 223, 230 (2020) (emphasis omitted).
114. McGinley et al., supra note 3, at 10.
115. Id.
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lower courts utilizing the case in their decisions that advance trans
rights, puts nonbinary employees at risk of falling outside Title
VII’s protections.116 Trans individuals, “by definition, do not
conform to certain sex stereotypes.”117 If an employer has a policy
that it “simply will not tolerate any individual who does not
identify as male or female,” this discriminatory policy is not, on its
face, explicitly prohibited by Bostock.118 Furthermore, employers
can potentially make firing decisions based not on gender identity
but on other prohibited behaviors. In Bostock, the majority states
“we do not purport to address bathrooms, locker rooms, or
anything else of the kind.”119 Under a close reading of Bostock, an
employer could “simply state that it was firing a [trans] employee,
not for being [trans], but simply for using the ‘wrong’ bathroom.”120
This firing policy would allow the employer to “circumvent the
Supreme Court’s explicit holding that discriminating against an
employee simply for being [trans] is not permitted” by using a
ground that falls outside of the Court’s opinion.121
While the majority opinion in Bostock takes a “very simple,
literal approach” to interpreting Title VII, the simplicity fails to
reflect the complicated realities of sexual orientation and gender
identity.122 In order for the law to serve and reflect “the existence of
all persons, not just those who fall within black-and-white
polarized binaries,” courts should “acknowledge the existence and
realities” of all people, including nonbinary, gender fluid, queer,
bisexual, and pansexual individuals, “who do not fit within rigid
binary definitional boxes.”123
C. Unanswered Questions
Bostock leaves unaddressed significant policy questions that
will unquestionably have massive impacts on the daily lives of
many. Professor Rena Lindevaldsen has persuasively identified a
116. Id. at 14–15.
117. Id. at 14.
118. Id. at 15.
119. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020).
120. McGinley et al., supra note 3, at 15.
121. Id.
122. Justin Blount, Sex-Differentiated Appearance Standards Post-Bostock, 31 GEO. MASON
U. C.R. L.J. 217, 217 (2021).
123. Marcus, supra note 113, at 234.
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number of questions left open by Bostock.124 This Part adopts much
of her analysis. Among these questions are (1) whether sex
discrimination in other federal statutes also includes sexual
orientation and gender identity, (2) whether Bostock “mandate[s]
a conclusion” that individuals have a legally actionable right to
use bathrooms consistent with gender identity, (3) what
implications the decision has on Title IX’s prohibition of sex
discrimination in education programs, (4) what implications
the decision has on access to medical services, (5) whether religious
employers with “sincerely held religious beliefs that conflict”
with the principle that “people can change their sex or that samesex attraction is acceptable” are exempt from the prohibition of
sex discrimination, and (6) whether the ministerial exception
protects religious employer’s decisions to employ or terminate
LGBTQ+ employees.125
To the first issue—whether the definition of sex discrimination
under Bostock will also change the definition of sex discrimination
under other federal statutes—there will likely be extended
litigation in the upcoming years to resolve these challenges. Justice
Alito was greatly concerned by this prospect in his dissent, noting
that “over 100 federal statutes prohibit discrimination because of
sex,” including the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act.126 Because the majority holding does not
explicitly state how far the decision extends, it remains unclear how
or whether enforcement of these federal statutes will change in the
upcoming years to conform with the Bostock decision.
Second, the majority opinion “dismisses questions about
‘bathrooms, locker rooms, or anything else of the kind.’”127 As a
result, the “brusque refusal to consider the consequences of its
reasoning”128 will likely lead to protracted litigation on whether
anti-trans bathroom bills constitute prohibited sex discrimination.
Indeed, not long after the Bostock ruling, two federal courts of
appeals took up the bathroom issue and found that “a district
policy requiring students to use a single-stall restroom or the
124. See Rena M. Lindevaldsen, Bostock v. Clayton County: A Pirate Ship Sailing Under
a Textualist Flag, 33 REGENT U. L. REV. 39, 40 (2020).
125. Id.
126. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1778 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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restroom that corresponded with the student’s biological sex”
violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.129 Though the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits found
these bathroom policies to constitute sex-based discrimination, as
states continue to introduce and push anti-trans legislation, there is
a strong likelihood a circuit split may emerge as to whether these
bathroom policies amount to sex-based discrimination.
Third, it is unclear whether Bostock’s definition of sex
discrimination applies to Title IX of the Civil Rights Act and how
this will impact schools and universities. Title IX provides that
schools can maintain “separate living facilities for the different
sexes.”130 If sexual orientation and gender identity are included in
this definition of sex, there will likely be protracted litigation as to
how this impacts sex-based housing in schools. Additionally,
Bostock may impact Title IX sports; the holding would suggest that
prohibiting trans women from competing on women’s sports teams
constitutes discrimination.131 However, because the holding in
Bostock only addressed Title VII, how Title IX will be enforced going
forward remains uncertain.
Fourth, it is possible Bostock may act as a cause of action for
LGBTQ+
individuals
suing
healthcare
providers
for
discrimination, particularly religious-based healthcare providers
who refuse to perform gender affirming care. Shortly following the
issuance of the decision, a trans man sued Catholic Hospitals for its
“refusal to remove” his uterus as part of gender affirming care.132
The complaint “specifically cited Bostock” in support of the claim.133
Again, the textual-focused nature of the majority opinion makes it
unclear whether Bostock will support sexual orientation and gender
identity-based discrimination lawsuits against healthcare providers
that refuse to provide services.
Fifth, the Court explicitly acknowledges in the majority opinion
that “[b]ecause RFRA operates as a kind of super statute . . . it might

129.
130.
131.
132.

Lindevaldsen, supra note 124, at 68.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Transgender Lawsuit Against Catholic Hospital Cites New US Supreme Court Precedent,
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Jul. 20, 2020, 4:47 PM), https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/
news/45241/transgender-lawsuit-against-catholic-hospital-cites-new-us-supreme-courtprecedent.
133. Id.
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supersede Title VII’s commands in appropriate cases” and does not
actually reconcile how these doctrines interact.134 There are two
primary issues that arise in this conflict—whether religious
employers can “engage in sex, sexual orientation, and gender
identity discrimination” in their employment decision, and how the
ministerial exception applies.135 The recent Supreme Court case Our
Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, decided in the same
term as Bostock, provides “[w]hen a school with a religious mission
entrusts a teacher with the responsibility of educating and forming
students in the faith, judicial intervention into disputes between the
school and the teacher threatens the school’s independence in a
way that the First Amendment does not allow.”136 The broad
reading of the ministerial exception, providing that “educating
young people in their faith” is a responsibility “at the very core of
the mission of a private religious school,”137 indicates that
ministers, teachers, and other faith leaders all fall under the
ministerial exception. Thus, it seems to follow that religious
institutions can discriminate because of sexual orientation and
gender identity when making employment decisions in positions
falling under the ministerial exception. However, it remains
unanswered by Bostock and Our Lady of Guadalupe whether religious
organizations can discriminate in employment decisions for roles
outside of the ministerial exception.
All of these unresolved questions regarding the extent to which
Bostock’s holding will impact other areas of the law will likely
involve protracted litigation with a high possibility of circuit splits
unless the legislature passes the Equality Act to resolve these
questions definitely and consistently.
III. CONGRESS MUST PASS THE EQUALITY ACT TO EXPAND
PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATION FOR ALL LGBTQ+ INDIVIDUALS
The Equality Act is a vital piece of legislation that will extend
protections to all LGBTQ+ individuals. While Bostock is a historic
and watershed moment for LGBTQ+ rights, it applies only to a
narrow area of law. In the Civil Rights Act, sex is only a protected
134.
135.
136.
137.
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ground in Title VII, meaning the expansion of sex discrimination to
include sexual orientation and gender identity is limited to the
scope of Title VII employment protections. Passing the Equality Act
will (1) ensure that the protections against sex discrimination are
not limited only to narrow Title VII actions, (2) rectify the Court’s
error of not relying on Price Waterhouse in Bostock’s holding,
(3) provide a clear, inclusive definition of sexual orientation and
gender identity, and (4) answer some of the questions left
unanswered in Bostock.
The Equality Act, as most recently presented to the Senate in
February of 2021,138 will amend the Civil Rights Act to include
protections for LGBTQ+ individuals and will prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex in more areas outside of
employment. The Equality Act will amend sections of the Civil
Rights Act by inserting the language “sex (including sexual
orientation and gender identity)” into the provisions that prohibit
discrimination in public accommodations, public facilities, public
education, housing, and more.139 Additionally, the Equality Act
will update and clarify the public spaces and services covered by
the Act, extending inclusion to “retail stores, such as banks and
legal services” as well as transportation services.140
A. The Equality Act Will Prevent Circuit Splits and the Overturning
of Bostock
Since Bostock was decided, the number of anti-trans bills
introduced in state legislatures has skyrocketed. The first three
months of 2021 saw over eighty anti-trans bills introduced,
surpassing the total number of anti-trans bills introduced in the
entirety of 2020.141 Bills range from prohibitions on healthcare for
trans youth, exclusions in athletics, and restrictions on
identification documents.142 A similar pattern emerged after the
138. Equality Act, S. 393, 117th Cong. (2021).
139. See Equality Act NOW, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/
equality (last visited Oct. 12, 2021).
140. Id.
141. Wyatt Ronan, Breaking: 2021 Becomes Record Year for Anti-Transgender Legislation,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Mar. 13, 2021), https://www.hrc.org/press-releases/breaking-2021becomes-record-year-for-anti-transgender-legislation.
142. Legislation Affecting LBGT Rights Across the Country, ACLU (Jul. 9, 2021),
https://www.aclu.org/legislation-affecting-lgbt-rights-across-country.
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legalization of gay marriage in 2015. Following Obergefell, states
introduced and passed laws providing religious exemptions for
services, “bathroom bills,” and other anti-LGBTQ+ legislation in
backlash to the decision.143 The “introduction and passage of antiLGBT legislation following Obergefell reflects a backlash that is
distinct from public opinion,” as it was largely amongst
conversative and far-right legislative groups.144
The status of Obergefell as good law has continued to be
questioned and challenged, both by state courts and justices on the
Supreme Court. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito have continued to
urge the Court to reconsider the ruling in Obergefell. In October of
2020, Justice Thomas wrote “the religious liberty of the many
Americans who believe that marriage is a sacred institution
between one man and one woman” is threatened by Obergefell.145
He asserted: “Due to Obergefell, those with sincerely held
religious beliefs concerning marriage will find it increasingly
difficult to participate in society without running afoul of
Obergefell and its effect on other antidiscrimination laws.”146
As the makeup of the Court continues to change, it remains
uncertain whether rights for LGBTQ+ individuals will remain
protected. Of the five judges who ruled with the majority in
Obergefell, only three remain on the bench. The ongoing criticism of
Obergefell, more than five years following the decision, will likely
remain an issue on the Court for years to come.
Bostock was ruled in a 6-3 decision, with Justice Thomas and
Justice Alito among the dissenters, as was the case in Obergefell.
Given the vigorous opposition to Bostock by the dissenters and
ongoing sentiment that Obergefell was decided incorrectly, if a case
challenging Obergefell or Bostock were to come before the Court,
there is a possibility the Court could overturn Bostock and declare
sex discrimination does not include sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination. Laws created by Supreme Court decisions
are subject to changes in ideology of the court, a body of
unelected judges. Contrastingly, laws passed by Congress are
143. Emily Kazyak & Mathew Stange, Backlash or a Positive Response? Public Opinion of
LGB Issues after Obergefell v. Hodges, SOCIO. DEP’T FAC. PUBL’NS (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1526&context=sociologyfacpub.
144. Id. at 26.
145. Davis v. Ermold, 141 S. Ct. 3, 3 (2020).
146. Id.
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created by elected public officials; changes to those laws are done
by the elected officials. The Equality Act will protect against the
possibility of Bostock being overturned by a future court by
explicitly amending all mentions of sex in the Civil Rights Act to be
clarified with the language “including sexual orientation and
gender identity.”
Additionally, even if Bostock is not overturned, as lower courts
interpret the holding that excludes Price Waterhouse and LGBTQ+
individuals who are not lesbian, gay, or trans, the Equality Act will
ensure that lower courts do not interpret sex discrimination
narrowly, excluding protections for some individuals.
B. Reconciling Religious Freedom Concerns to Ensure the Act Passes in
the Senate
One notable provision of the Equality Act that has been subject
to a high volume of controversy is Section 1107 that states “[t]he
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 shall not provide a
claim concerning, or a defense to a claim under, a covered title, or
provide a basis for challenging the application or enforcement of a
covered title.”147
This portion of the Act will take a step in resolving the question
of how to balance freedom of religion with sex discrimination
prohibitions. However, opponents to the Equality Act argue that
this provision goes too far and does not strike a proper balance
between the First Amendment and prohibitions against
discrimination. If this portion of the Act remains in its current form,
it is unlikely that the Act will be passed in the Senate.148 Even if,
somehow, it is passed, this provision will likely bring about
protracted litigation as to its constitutionality. Therefore, for an
effective version of the Equality Act to be passed, this provision
147. Equality Act, H.R. 5, 116th Cong. § 1107 (2020).
148. In the current Senate, Democrats have a narrow 50-50 majority. Due to the Senate’s
60-vote filibuster rule, assuming that every democratic senator would vote in favor of the
act, a minimum of 10 Republican Senators would need to support the Equality Act in order
for it to pass. Republican representatives, such as Senator Susan Collins, who have either
supported or been amenable to previous versions of the Equality Act, have expressed their
opposition to the current religious balancing language. Thus, the possibility of 10 Republican
Senators voting in favor of the Equality Act is low unless the bill is amended to provide more
religious accommodations. Grace Segers, Senate Could Expand LGBTQ Protections with
Equality Act, CBS NEWS (Jun. 10, 2021, 8:50 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/equalityact-lgbtq-protection-bill-senate/.
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likely needs to be amended to better consider the question of how
to balance freedom of religion and LGBTQ+ rights. One possibility
that might gain sufficient support from Republican Senators to pass
the Equality Act would be to amend the Act to mirror some of the
language of the Do No Harm Act, a bill introduced in the House in
February of 2021.149 The Do No Harm Act attempts to prevent
RFRA from being “interpreted to authorize an exemption from
generally applicable law that imposes meaningful harm, including
dignitary harm, on a third party.”150 The Equality Act could be
amended to clarify that RFRA claims can be brought but cannot
be sustained if doing so would impose meaningful harm or would
be in opposition to the equal opportunities protected by the Civil
Rights Act. Additionally, the Do No Harm Act would clarify that
RFRA is applicable to “judicial proceeding[s] to which the
government is a party”; it may be useful to make this same
clarification in an amendment to the Equality Act.151
CONCLUSION
Bostock is a landmark case that is humanizing in its
straightforwardly textual argument, firmly asserting gender,
presentation, expression, sexuality, and physicality are inextricable
from sex.152 However, the failure to incorporate the precedent of
Price Waterhouse into the majority’s holding can potentially exclude
bisexual, nonbinary, and other individuals under the LGBTQ+
umbrella who are not gay, lesbian, or trans men or women from
protections under Title VII. In order for sex discrimination to truly
protect all LGBTQ+ individuals without the risk of the opinion
being overturned or discrepancy in protections across geographic
areas, Congress must pass the Equality Act to ensure that these
rights are entrenched.

149. Do No Harm Act, H.R. 1378, 117th Cong. (2021).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Slepoi, supra note 92.
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